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The (non) consolidation of Kosovo’s statehood: 





 The Kosovo-Serbia dialogue is one of the most important 
processes that the Republic of Kosovo has been engaged since 
its independence in 2008. However, from the beginning, the so-
called Brussels dialogue has been characterized by the lack of 
transparency, dishonesty, and ambiguity. This article 
concentrates on the effect of the Brussels dialogue on the 
consolidation of Kosovo‟s statehood. The article reveals that the 
Kosovo-Serbia dialogue has damaged Kosovo‟s statehood 
internally and weakened it externally. While in the domestic 
aspect, the agreements reached in the dialogue have posed a 
serious challenge for Kosovo‟s political and judicial systems, in 
the international arena, the dialogue has been an obstruction to 
Kosovo‟s efforts to consolidate its position in the international 
relations. The Brussels dialogue is rather unique and 
unprecedented for the state consolidation literature in the sense 
that a democratic and sovereign state interferes, with the 
support of all international actors, in the internal affairs and 
organization of another democratic and sovereign country. This 
article also shows the EU‟s impotence as a mediator in this 
process.  
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Bilateral disputes between Kosovo and Serbia date back to 
the early „90ies. Ever since Milosevic abrogated Kosovo‟s 
autonomy in 1989, relations between Kosovo and Serbia have 
gone from bad to worse, which eventually culminated with a 
war in the late „90ies. The war ended with a NATO bombing 
campaign against Milosevic‟s Yugoslavia, who preliminarily 
refused to sign a peace agreement which would have ended the 
conflict by giving Kosovo a substantial autonomy. After the 
war, Kosovo spent almost nine years in a status quo: its status 
was not defined while it remained a UN protectorate.  
In 2005, negotiations on Kosovo‟s status between Kosovo 
and Serbia under international mediation were initiated. 
However, the so-called Vienna negotiations led only to the 
unilateral declaration of independence by Kosovo, which did 
not solve the disputes between the latter and Serbia. 
Consequently, in 2011 a new process of dialogue between 
Kosovo and Serbia started with the aim of addressing a few 
technical issues, such as free movement or mutual recognition 
of diplomas. Thus, the new dialogue between Kosovo and 
Serbia was said to be only technical. In reality, the so-called 
„Brussels dialogue‟ was political from the beginning.   
This paper analyses the Brussels dialogue1 with regard to the 
consolidation of Kosovo statehood internally, and in the 
international arena2. Domestically, the dialogue has been 
supposed to facilitate the integration of the Serb community in 
Kosovo‟s institutional life and remove the influence of Serbia, 
                                                     
1 The dialogue between Kosovo and Serbia is being held in parallel at two 
distinct levels: at the technical level and at the political level. Since these two 
processes are tightly intertwined, and in order to avoid confusion, we 
consider both levels of dialogue as a single process.  
2 By “internal consolidation” we mean controlling all its territory, having 
effective institutions and exercising sovereignty throughout its territory. By 
“external consolidation” we mean equal representation and membership in 
the international organizations, including the United Nations.  
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which has been exercised through its parallel institutions and 
activities in the Republic of Kosovo. Internationally, the 
dialogue has been considered as a key tool which would 
eventually pave the way for Kosovo‟s membership in 
international organizations, including the UN, thus leading to 
the full consolidation of the Kosovo statehood in the 
international arena.  
This paper argues that the dialogue has not contributed to 
the strengthening of the Kosovo statehood internally, nor it has 
contributed to the consolidation of the Republic of Kosovo as 
an international actor. Rather, the dialogue has slowed down 
the process of recognition of Kosovo‟s independence, since 
countries that have doubts on the legality and legitimacy of the 
independence of Kosovo are waiting for the dialogue epilogue, 
hoping that it will clarify the situation. At the same time, 
internally, the agreements which derive from the Brussels 
dialogue, have only formalized the influence and presence of 
Serbia in Kosovo, and have threatened Kosovo‟s internal 
organization and its constitutional order.  
The paper analyses the role of the EU in the process too, 
which was deemed to be the facilitator, but in reality, it has 
been the mediator from the beginning.  
The paper starts by giving an overview of the Brussels 
Dialogue from the beginning up to date. Then, it analyses the 
approach of the EU to the dialogue. Moving on, the paper 
discusses the first political agreement between Kosovo and 
Serbia and the SAA between the EU and Kosovo. In the end, we 
discuss the outcomes of the dialogue so far.   
 
The Brussels dialogue: an overview  
 
Shortly after the International Court of Justice‟s opinion on 
whether the „unilateral declaration of independence by the      
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Provisional Institutions of Self-Government of Kosovo was in 
accordance with international law‟, a UN resolution, sponsored 
by Serbia and the 27 EU member states, was adopted calling for 
a process of dialogue between Belgrade and Pristina, under the 
EU facilitation (UN, 2010). Through this resolution, the UN 
stressed that „[The General Assembly] Welcomes the readiness 
of the European Union to facilitate a process of dialogue 
between the parties; the process of dialogue in itself would be a 
factor for peace, security, and stability in the region, and that 
dialogue would be to promote cooperation, achieve progress on 
the path to the European Union and improve the lives of the 
people‟ (UN, 2010). The resolution came as a compromise text 
between Serbia (who initially planned a resolution questioning 
Kosovo‟s independence) and the European Union.  
The dialogue‟s initial purpose has been to solve all open 
issues between two countries and potentially be concluded 
with a comprehensive legally-binding agreement, which would 
eventually end the long-lasting conflict and normalize the 
relations between the two countries (Bieber, 2015). The 
normalization of the relations between Kosovo and Serbia is a 
must for both countries in order to advance in their paths 
towards European Integration (EU, 2018). In this context, a 
legally-binding agreement between the two states is expected to 
enable Kosovo to be part of the international organizations, 
including the EU, thus leading to the full consolidation of the 
Kosovo statehood in the international arena.  
In the beginning, there was neither a clear roadmap of the 
timeline nor a defined objective of the process. Rather, the 
initial idea of the High Representative, Catherine Ashton, was 
to promote a dialogue between the two countries in order to 
reduce tensions, relax bilateral relations, and produce a 
settlement of some key issues that have been real obstacles for 
Kosovo (Bieber, 2015). Thus, the EU did not seek to resolve the 
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question of Kosovo‟s statehood but sought to set it aside in 
order to make some practical progress on the ground. But, 
putting the issue of Kosovo‟s status aside led to a number of 
consequences for the process of dialogue. More importantly, it 
precluded the signing of formal agreements which would have 
implied that agreements were legally binding (Bieber, 2015). 
Hence, trying to avoid the question of status in order to achieve 
tangible results, the EU, in fact, damaged the process itself and 
the implementation of the agreements on the ground.  
The Pristina-Belgrade3 dialogue began as a „technical 
dialogue‟ because of the insistence of the Kosovo government 
that “political dialogue is not on the table” Bajrami, 2013). 
However, while this position changed over time, in reality, the 
dialogue was political from the beginning. Similarly, the 
Kosovo government‟s promise that internal state issues will not 
be discussed with Serbia, turned out to be untrue, since many 
internal issues, including issues related to the North of Kosovo, 
were discussed and negotiated in the dialogue (Bajrami, 2013). 
Nonetheless, since the process started as a technical one and the 
issues to be discussed were technical, the negotiating teams 
from both countries were not of the highest level. Serbian 
delegation was led by Borko Stefanovic, appointed by the then 
Serbia President, Boris Tadic, while the head of Kosovar 
delegation was appointed Edita Tahiri, Deputy prime minister 
and minister for dialogue.  
The technical dialogue produced numerous agreements 
which aimed to solve some non-political issues. However, over 
time, it became clear that the implementation of the technical 
agreements needs a degree of political will. Thus, a political 
dialogue was inevitable. The political dialogue, which began in 
the 2012 autumn, brought together prime ministers of two 
                                                     
3 This is the official name of the Brussels dialogue  
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countries, Mr. Hashim Thaci of Kosovo and Mr. Ivica Dacic of 
Serbia.  
The Brussels dialogue has been characterized by tensions 
and frequent interruption. The 2014 national elections in both 
countries, the 2014 elections for the EU institutions and the 2016 
Presidential elections in Serbia, have contributed to slowing 
down the process. Also, domestic political tensions, in 
particular in Kosovo, have paralyzed the dialogue for almost 
two years (Koha Ditore, 2014).  Nevertheless, up to date, over 
23 agreements have been reached, even though most of them 
have not been implemented yet.  
From the beginning, the process has been criticized for the 
lack of transparency and accountability (KDI, 2016). The lack of 
transparency has been problematic because the ordinary people 
have no idea how the implementation of the agreements will 
affect their lives (KDI, 2016). Consequently, Kosovo citizens 
from both communities lacked the willingness and readiness to 
participate and facilitate the implementation of the agreements. 
Furthermore, in many cases, they have resisted the 
implementation of the dialogue agreements4. At the same time, 
because of the top-down approach, the agreements have had a 
small possibility to directly impact the ethnic reconciliation in 
Kosovo, since those agreements can hardly be enforced in their 
entirety without the support of the people for whom those 
agreements are dedicated. Thus, the dialogue can be considered 
more an “Elite pact-making” and exclusive process, rather than 
an inclusive process that aims to deliver the real problems of 
the inhabitants of Kosovo.  
 
 
                                                     
4 Such resistance has been noted in the case of Agreement on 
Association/community of Serb municipalities and agreement for the 
revitalization of the bridge in Mitrovica.   
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Stability first, democracy second. Is the EU to blame? 
 
The dialogue between Kosovo and Serbia is of great 
importance for the EU itself. It was considered a good 
opportunity for the newly established European External 
Action Service, headed by Ashton, to achieve some positive 
results in its early days. The dialogue has been also a test for the 
EU mediation and „its ability to utilize the prospect of accession 
to address protracted conflicts‟ (Bieber, 2015:290). Therefore, 
the EEAS and particularly the High Representatives Ashton 
and Mogherini have been maximally dedicated to the process.  
However, the EU is showing its impotence to deal with such 
a complicated and fragile process. As Bieber argues, the EU 
top-down approach „left considerable room for divergent and 
conflicting interpretations of key provisions‟ that resulted in a 
lack of implementation of the agreements (Bieber, 2015:290). 
Consequently, up to date, most of the agreements have not 
been fully implemented or their implementation has not started 
yet (See: Office of the PM, Reports on Dialogue). Furthermore, 
the implementation of the agreements is also affected by the 
EU‟s “creative ambiguity” approach, which portrayed success 
where there was little (Bieber, 2015:297). Thus, the ambiguity of 
the agreements reached between Serbia and Kosovo in the 
dialogue, complicated their implementation, since both pairs 
had their own version and interpretation of the agreements.  
The EU approach to dialogue also led to a lack of transparency 
and accountability, which is one of the weakest points of the 
dialogue (Beha, 2015). The Kosovar public, civil society, and 
even opposition parties and their MPs, in most cases, have been 
informed by the media only after the agreements have been 
signed (KDI, 2016). For instance, the former prime minister, Isa 
Mustafa, reported only once during its term in the Kosovo 
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Assembly on the issues concerning the Kosovo -Serbia dialogue 
(KDI, 2018).  
Another serious concern, with regard to the EU role in the 
process, is that the dialogue and factors that affect it have taken 
priority over the rule of law-based issues, including the 
functionality of EULEX. Since the unpredictability of the 
Kosovar leadership implicates a degree of uncertainty over the 
stability of the region, EULEX has been instructed, and even 
pressured from the Brussels, not to disturb the dialogue and 
those involved (Jackson, 2015). Combating high-profile 
corruption and organized crime, which would potentially 
involve Kosovo‟s political elites, would pose a risk for 
destabilization and also would eliminate the EU‟s negotiating 
partners. Hence, certain elites, which are critical to the 
dialogue, have received extra impunity from the EU and the 
international community for the sake of stability (See: 
Capussela, 2015). Moreover, by pushing Kosovo to be more 
engaged in dialogue with the EU rather than with its own 
parliament, the EU is undermining and damaging the strength 
of the state that it is helping to build (Hoogenboom, 2011). At 
the same time, by prioritizing the stability over 
democratization, the EU is undermining its fundamental values 
and its reputation as a normative actor.  
To move on, the EU‟s inability to have a single voice and a 
unified policy toward Kosovo is another feature that has 
affected its role in the Brussels dialogue. The EU‟s role as a 
mediator in the dialogue has been mostly defined by the five 
EU countries that do not recognize Kosovo, thus hindering a 
full and credible European perspective for Kosovo. The EU 
„neutrality‟ towards Kosovo‟s independence has limited the EU 
credibility in the eyes of Kosovar public and its authorities. But, 
some European diplomats argue that by not recognizing 
Kosovo‟s independence, the five EU countries “helped the EU 
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become the best possible facilitator in the dialogue between 
Belgrade and Pristina” (Quoted in Palokaj and Tuhina, 2016). 
One of the highest EU officials involved in the facilitation of the 
dialogue admits that “this is also an advantage because it enables us 
[the EU] to be the best possible facilitator in the dialogue between 
Kosovo and Serbia, by being neutral. We tell the Kosovars that their 
independence is a done deal because the vast majority of EU member 
states recognized them, and we tell the Serbs that five countries still 
did not recognize Kosovo, and thus we are neutral towards status” 
(Palokaj and Tuhina, 2016, p. 12).  
Nonetheless, seeing from a positive point of view, the EU 
has been able to link Serbia‟s EU accession and the status of 
Kosovo through some EU members which „sought a more 
constructive role for Serbia in relation to Kosovo as a 
prerequisite to accepting Serbia‟s EU membership application‟ 
(Bieber, 2015, p. 298). Individually, Germany and the UK 
conditioned Serbia‟s progress toward the EU with the progress 
in Belgrade‟s dialogue with Kosovo, thus signaling that the 
normalization of the relations with Kosovo is a must for Serbia 
in order to consider its application for EU membership (Gazeta 
Zëri, 2016). This ended the Serbian government‟s ambition to 
decouple its EU accession process from its policy towards 
Kosovo.  
Thus, as we can note, the EU‟s involvement in the process 
has been crucial as it meant that the dialogue between two 
countries and their willingness to compromise have been 
embedded in EU accession. For Kosovo, the SAA has been the 
incentive offered by the EU while for Serbia the rewards have 
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Looking for normalization: The Brussels agreement and 
the normalization of the relations 
 
During 2011 and 2012, Kosovo and Serbia reached several 
technical agreements which would presumably improve the life 
of Kosovo citizens, in particular, help the integration of 
Kosovo-Serbs into the Kosovo institutional and social life. 
Nevertheless, as we noted above, despite being considered as 
technical, the implementation of these agreements needed a 
degree of political will from both sides. Hence, in order to 
ensure the necessary political will to implement the 
agreements, parallel to the technical dialogue started a political 
dialogue, as a process of for the normalization of relations. In 
the political dialogue, both countries were represented by their 
prime minister, and the importance given to the political level 
overshadowed the technical dialogue.   
Around sixth months after the political dialogue between 
Kosovo and Serbia started, the first agreement of principles 
governing the normalization of relations (which is known also 
as the April or Brussels agreement) was achieved, by 19 April 
2013, under the EU mediation (The first agreement of 
principles, 2013). The April agreement has been considered as a 
starting point for a long process of reconciliation and 
normalization of the relations between Kosovo and Serbia, 
which eventually will be concluded with a legally binding 
agreement between two countries (Beha, 2015). At the same 
time, the agreement has been considered a milestone in the 
Kosovo-Serbia relations and a remarkable development for 
both countries in their respective paths towards European 
Integration (Bieber, 2015). 
The April Agreement is of particular importance for the 
process of normalization of relations between Kosovo and 
Serbia since it is the first international agreement to be reached 
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between Serbia and Kosovo, after the latter declared its 
independence in 2008. Up to April 2013, all the agreements that 
were reached in relation to Kosovo - Serbia conflict were done 
between the international community and one of the parties, 
but not between Serbia and Kosovo (Mehmeti, 2013). Therefore, 
the April Agreement is a signal that Serbia has moved from its 
previous position and can deal with Kosovo on equal terms. 
From the Kosovo side, the April Agreement has been 
considered as a “historic agreement” which represents the 
“factual recognition” of Kosovo (Beha, 2015).  
A particular feature of the April Agreement has been the so-
called „creative ambiguity‟ which avoided a clear and direct 
address of the status of Kosovo (Bieber, 2015). The parties are 
considered as „sides‟ without further details and there is not 
any indication concerning Kosovo‟s statehood. In fact, it was 
only due to this creative ambiguity that the agreement was 
possible to be reached. Otherwise, any direct or indirect 
involvement of Kosovo‟s status would have hampered the deal.       
However, looking from a different point of view, the Brussels 
agreement touches some sensitive issues of the internal 
organization of Kosovo, including the Justice, Police, and 
provides the creation of Association/Community of Serb 
Municipalities, which poses a direct threat to the unitary 
system of the Republic of Kosovo (The first agreement of 
principles, 2013). In its first six articles, the agreement 
underlines general principles for the creation of the Community 
of Serb municipalities. According to this arrangement, a 
Community of Serb Municipalities shall be created in Kosovo, 
which will have “full overview of the areas of economic 
development, education, health, urban and rural planning” 
(Ibid. Article 4). Furthermore, according to the second article of 
the agreement, “the Community/Association will be created by 
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statute [and] its dissolution shall only take place by a decision 
of the participating municipalities” (Ibid. Article 2).  
The idea of an autonomous Serb region in northern Kosovo 
goes beyond the Ahtisaari plan. It challenges the principle of 
multi-ethnic Kosovo that has been promoted by the 
international community and which is at the core of the Kosovo 
Constitution (Constitution of the Republic of Kosovo, 2008). 
This argument has been supported also by the Constitutional 
Court of Kosovo. On 23 December 2015, after the then President 
of Kosovo, Atifete Jahjaga, brought a referral concerning the 
compatibility of the ASM and its general principles/main 
elements with the spirit of the Constitution to the 
Constitutional Court of the Republic of Kosovo, the latter 
decided that „the Principles as elaborated in the 
"Association/Community of Serb majority municipalities in 
Kosovo - general principles/main elements" are not entirely in 
compliance with the spirit of the Constitution, Article 3 
[Equality Before the Law], paragraph 1, Chapter II 
[Fundamental Rights and Freedoms] and Chapter III [Rights of 
Communities and Their Members] of the Constitution of the 
Republic of Kosovo‟ (Constitutional Court, 2015). Ever since the 
status of Association/Community has been „frozen‟.  
It has been argued that the formation of the 
Community/Association of Serb Municipalities means a de facto 
Kosovo Serb government with conflicting legal guarantees by 
Kosovo Constitution and the applicable law (KIPRED, 2013). 
Jackson argues that ASM represents a „unified Serb political 
entity, removed from the central system, with the power to 
make legally binding decisions‟(Jackson, 2015:43). The 
association/community (ASM) would have greater power in 
the judiciary and the police. The ASM would have a regional 
police commander, whose ethnicity must be Serb, and who will 
be proposed by the ASM and approved by both Pristina and 
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Belgrade (Ibid. p. 56). This is an unprecedented case when an 
independent country concedes power in its own rule of law 
matters to a foreign government. 
Additionally, the Association/Community creates the third 
level of power in Kosovo, something between the central and 
local power. The April agreement provides the ASM with full 
competencies in education (actually it is the competence of the 
Ministry of Education), economic development (it is the 
competence of municipalities), health (it is the competence of 
the Ministry of Health), and urban and rural planning (it is the 
competence of Ministry of Environment and Spatial Planning) 
(Beha, 2015). The Law on Local Self-Government states that 
“Such associations may offer to its members a number of 
services, including training, capacity building, technical 
assistance as well as research on municipal competencies and 
policy recommendation in accordance with law” (Beha 2015, p. 
115). But, such associations, for instance, the Association of 
Municipalities in Kosovo, do not have any executive power and 
are qualified as NGOs. Therefore, as Beha rightly points out, 
„the 19 April Agreement reinforces a third level of “stronger” 
power in Kosovo, because the Association of Serb 
Municipalities, as the third level of governance in Kosovo, 
would have extensive powers, which the Association of 
Municipalities in Kosovo does not possess‟ (Ibid. p. 118).  
The ASM is also in contradiction with the European Charter 
of Local Self-Government to whom the agreement refers.  
Instead of bringing the institutional services closer to the 
citizens, what the basic principle of the charter, subsidiarity, 
requires, the formation of ASM means exactly the opposite: 
centralizing the institutional services and decision-making 
(ECLSG, 1985).    
Besides these arguments, there is also the danger of this 
entity being captured and controlled by Serb radicals. This fear 
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is related to another „creature‟ of the April agreement, Lista 
Srbska. Aiming to motivate the integration and participation of 
the Kosovo Serbs in Kosovo elections and institutions, Lista 
Srpska was established, based on the agreement between the 
then Prime Ministers, Thaci, and Dacic. However, while the 
formation of Srbska Lista was meant to help Kosovo Serbs to 
integrate into Kosovo institutions and be better represented, in 
fact, the formation of Srbska Lista proved the opposite. 
In the 2013 local elections, Lista Srbska based in, and 
controlled by Belgrade, won all but one Serb majority 
municipality in Kosovo. Thus, beyond the North, Lista Srbska 
enabled the Serbian government to extend its control in the 
Southern Serb majority municipalities, too. Moreover, by 
labeling Kosovo Serb politicians as loyal partners of Kosovo 
government, Lista Srbska, helped by local media, initiated a 
campaign against them, thus eliminating them from the 
political scene (Gazeta Express, 2017). In this way, instead of 
supporting Kosovo Serb politicians, who have continuously 
been engaged in advancing the interest of Kosovo Serbs 
through the integration and participation in the Kosovo 
institutional and social life, the Brussels dialogue penalized 
them and established a new elite of Serb politicians in Kosovo, 
hard-core nationalists and controlled by Belgrade.   
Another important feature of the April agreement is 
judiciary. The agreement provides that as part of the 
integration of the parallel judicial authorities within the Kosovo 
legal framework, a department of the Appellate court in 
Pristina, composed of a majority of Kosovo Serbs judges, will 
be established in the Mitrovica North (Agreement on Justice, 
2015). This department/panel will deal with all Kosovo Serb 
majority municipalities. By establishing a special 
department/panel of the Appellate court, composed of Serbs 
and Albanians only, the agreement conflicts with the Kosovo 
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constitutional principle of non-discrimination based on 
ethnicity (Constitution of the Republic of Kosovo, 2008). 
Furthermore, the functioning of a department/panel of 
Appellate Court, who will have jurisdiction only over the 
Kosovo Serbs, encroachments on Kosovo‟s unitary legal system.    
The agreement also was meant to dismantle the Serbian parallel 
institution in northern Kosovo. In fact, it only legitimized those 
structures by integrating them into the Kosovo legal framework 
(Mehmeti, 2013). Before this agreement, Belgrade had a strong 
influence in the North of Kosovo that was criticized and 
opposed by both Kosovo and the international community. 
Through the April agreement, Serbia not only legitimized its 
influence in the North of Kosovo but also extended its influence 
in the South (Beha, 2015).  
Finally, the April agreement is only „a drop in the ocean‟ 
since the normalization of relations between Kosovo and Serbia 
is still far away with the latter continuing to block Kosovo in 
the international arena. The dialogue in general and the April 
agreement, in particular, have failed to address the most 
important issues between two countries, including transitional 
justice, particularly the fate of missing people. Even worse, 
these and other dealing with the past issues between Kosovo 
and Serbia are not expected to be addressed during the next 
phase of the dialogue, which eventually will conclude this 
process.  
 
Stabilization and Association Agreement (SAA)  
 
For both countries, the EU facilitated dialogue came ahead of 
the beginning of their EU integration processes. Thus, strong 
incentives of both Kosovo and Serbia to show their willingness 
to move toward the EU has been a key factor that enabled some 
concessions concerning the Kosovo-Serbia relations. As the 
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main reward, Serbia was offered the opening of the accession 
talks while Kosovo was offered a Stabilization and Association 
Agreement, which has been considered of a particular 
importance for Kosovo since it is the first contractual agreement 
between Kosovo and the EU.  
The Stabilization and Association Agreement (SAA) 
negotiations with Kosovo started in October 2013, as a reward 
for the „April agreement‟ with Serbia earlier that year. The SAA 
was initiated in July 2014 while it was signed one year later, 
roughly two years after the start of the negotiations. It has been 
Kosovo‟s main benefit from the dialogue so far. 
The SAA is the first formal step towards the EU integration, 
thus, besides the rhetoric that Kosovo has a European future, 
the signing of the SAA was the first practical step in this regard. 
It is also of a particular importance for the EU-Kosovo relations 
since, as we noted above, it is the first contractual agreement 
between the parties. The SAA provides a great opportunity for 
Kosovo to access the EU market. At the same time, its 
implementation will produce significant results for Kosovo in 
other realms too. The EU Stabilization and Association 
Agreement will benefit Kosovo‟s economy, rule of law, 
education, industry, environment, energy system, and many 
other realms. Moreover, besides these positive effects, its 
positive impact on trade with the EU and helping in the 
harmonization of the Kosovo legislation with the acquis 
communautaire, the SAA is a very important instrument in the 
fight against trafficking, money laundering, and terrorism 
(Palokaj and Tuhina, 2016, p. 9). Therefore, the full 
implementation of the SAA will change the country for the 
better. As Palokaj and Tuhina (2016) rightly argue, the SAA 
undoubtedly has historical significance without any 
exaggeration, since it finally closes the long and difficult 
process of establishing a contractual relationship between the 
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latter and the Union. Meanwhile, by concluding the SAA with 
Kosovo, the EU closes a very long process that started at the 
end of 2000.  
Another important feature to be mentioned is that despite 
the EU‟s neutrality towards Kosovo, the EU was able to sign the 
SAA agreement with Kosovo5. Thus, the case of the SAA 
proved that if Kosovo complies with the EU requirements, the 
Union –despite lacking a unified policy towards Kosovo- is able 
to find a practical solution for Kosovo in order to advance its 
EU integration process.  
Nevertheless, besides these positive effects, there are some 
concerns with regard to Kosovo‟s SAA, which is different from 
those of the other countries in the region.  Palokaj and Tuhina 
(2016) argue that the fact that this agreement is distinct from 
similar EU agreements with other countries in legal terms 
constitutes a matter of concern for Kosovo‟s full integration into 
the EU. For instance, the EU does not take over the obligation to 
advance the rapprochement with Kosovo, as is the case with 
other countries (Ibid.). In Serbia‟s or Albania‟s SAA, the chapter 
on political dialogue highlights the full integration into the 
community of democratic nations and a gradual 
rapprochement towards the EU, as some of the objectives of the 
dialogue (Ibid. pp 15-16). In the case of Kosovo, there is not a 
clear reference that SAA leads to Kosovo‟s full integration into 
the EU, as it was stipulated in other cases (Palokaj and Tuhina, 
2016, p. 16). These discrepancies, which exist due to status-
related legal obstacles, will make it impossible for Kosovo to 
                                                     
5 The SAA with Kosovo was only possible thanks to the Lisbon treaty, which 
conferred legal personality to the EU meaning that the Commission can sign 
international agreements on its own, thus avoiding ratification by member 
states. Was the agreement to be ratified by the EU member states, it would 
have been „mission impossible‟ because of the five EU members who do not 
recognize Kosovo‟s statehood 
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take the following formal step that each country took after 
signing the stabilization and association agreement: submitting 
a request for the EU membership.      
Moreover, the clause “should circumstances so permit” 
follows when the agreement mentions some crucial objectives. 
For instance, the article 11 on political dialogue states that 
political dialogue „is intended to promote in particular 
Kosovo‟s participation in the international democratic 
community‟, followed by the sentence „should objective 
circumstances so permit‟ (SAA, 2015). This makes Kosovo‟s EU 
integration perspective rather ambiguous and vague. At the 
same time, instead of European integration, in the case of 
Kosovo, the term used is „European perspective‟ which is a 
broader and vague term (Palokaj and Tuhina, 2016). Besides 
this, since the possibility of membership is reserved only for 
states, and the EU does not formally recognize Kosovo as a 
state, even the full implementation of the SAA will not 
guarantee a clear European Integration perspective. This 
ambiguous approach has also been used in the latest 
enlargement strategy by the European Commission (EC, 2018).   
However, it is important to underline that the SAA is not the 
warranty to be integrated into the EU. Obviously, it is a good 
benefit and opportunity to fulfill the conditions and standards 
required to become a full EU member. Nonetheless, the SAA is 
a necessary but not a sufficient condition for EU accession, in 
particular, in case of Kosovo and Serbia, where the unresolved 
territorial disputes and tense relations constitutes a major 
obstacle for both countries in their paths toward the European 
integration. The full normalization of relations between Kosovo 
and Serbia has been reemphasized in the 2018 enlargement 
strategy as a key precondition for both countries in order to 
advance in their respective EU integration paths (EC, 2018).  
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The outcomes of the dialogue 
 
When the dialogue between Pristina and Belgrade began in 
March 2011 there was not a defined objective of the process. 
The whole process started as an effort to reduce tensions and 
eventually produce a settlement of some key issues that were 
real obstacles for Kosovo (Bieber, 2015). At the same time, the 
newly established diplomatic office in Brussels, External Action 
Service, was eager for a success in its early days and the 
dialogue between Pristina and Belgrade provided such an 
opportunity (Bieber, 2015). However, the results of the dialogue 
are rather complicated. Indeed, the situation on the ground, 
particularly in the North of Kosovo, has started to improve 
albeit very slowly. Nonetheless, most of the agreements 
between the parties, including the 19 April agreement are still 
far from being implemented.   
The implementation of the agreements from the dialogue has 
turned out to be a major problem. Out of 23 agreements 
reached so far, only four of them have been fully implemented, 
while the vast majority of the others have stagnated in the first 
stage of implementation or their implementation has not 
started at all. Thus, the implementation of most agreements is 
either ambiguous or delayed. Serbia‟s parallel structures are 
still active while the Serbs of Kosovo are not yet „sufficiently 
integrated into Kosovo's system‟ (EP, 2017, p. 2). Similar 
problems have been noticed with the implementation of the 
2015 energy deal, which has been delayed, and the agreement 
on telecommunication which has only recently started to 
implement (Ibid.). Meanwhile, some positive results have been 
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noted in other topics discussed in Brussels, such as the IBM 
agreement6.  
The difficulties in the implementation of the agreements 
reached during the Brussels dialogue are a result of numerous 
factors. First, the lack of implementation is a result of the 
exclusion of the local Serbs who are feeling abandoned by the 
Serbian government and also excluded from the government of 
Kosovo (Beha, 2015). They have refused to be part of the 
implementation process of the agreements reached in Brussels 
since influenced by the Serbian nationalist media and public 
discourse, they believe that these agreements lead to the 
recognition of Kosovo‟s statehood by Serbia and Kosovo Serbs. 
Thus, where possible, they have hampered the implementation 
of the agreements and often accused Serbia of „selling Kosovo 
and Kosovo Serbs” (OBCT, 2010). 
Second, the other factor that has negatively affected the 
implementation of the dialogue agreements is the so-called 
„creative ambiguity‟. By using this approach, the EU left to both 
parties‟ discretion to interpret the agreements in the way they 
want. This dual interpretation of the same agreements has been 
used by the EU in order to reach practical results, thus avoiding 
issues that would be an obstacle, such as the question of 
Kosovo‟s status. This approach has been very fruitful in 
achieving agreements in different areas, but it has been proven 
to be a serious problem when it comes to the implementation 
stage. However, some argue that less ambiguous agreements 
would have been impossible to be reached (Van Der Borgh, Le 
Roy, & Zweerink, 2016).   
Except for these problems with the implementation, the 
dialogue also has failed so far to solve the issue of Kosovo‟s 
                                                     
6 The IBM abbreviation has two meanings: Integrated border management, 
for Kosovo, and Integrated boundary management for, Serbia. This dual 
interpretation is due to the so-called „creative ambiguity‟ approach by the EU. 
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representation and consolidation in the international arena. 
Kosovo‟s applications in international organizations such as the 
United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural 
Organization (UNESCO) have been hindered by Serbia‟s 
campaign against Kosovo‟s membership. Serbia‟s campaign 
and lobbying against Kosovo have also been major obstacles for 
Kosovo‟s potential UN membership. While part of the 19 April 
agreement has been a commitment by both countries to not 
block their counterpart‟s path towards EU integration, no effort 
has been made by the EU to push Serbia to do the same when it 
comes to Kosovo‟s UN membership. On the other hand, 
Kosovo has been powerless to pressure the EU to achieve any 
agreement or commitment by Serbia that would have paved the 
way for Kosovo‟s UN membership. However, it is surprising 
how Kosovo has not been more persistent in its demand to 
achieve a practical solution that would enable the country to 
become a UN member since the UN membership is of vital 
importance for the consolidation of the statehood 
internationally (Mehmeti, 2013).  
On the other hand, the Brussels dialogue has produced 
results which have been a real challenge for the unitary system 
of the Republic of Kosovo. The agreement on Justice and the 
arrangement for the creation of the ASM, are the best examples. 
Moreover, the Brussels dialogue, instead of integrating Kosovo 
Serbs into the Kosovo institutional and social life, it has 
contributed to a bigger segregation based on ethnic lines, 




The Brussels dialogue has neither contributed to the 
strengthening of Kosovo‟s statehood internally nor has it 
contributed in consolidating it internationally. The Republic of 
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Kosovo is still struggling to control and exercise its sovereignty 
in some part of the country while in the international arena, it 
has been blocked by Serbia in all its attempts to join 
international organizations.  
At the same time, the dialogue has been characterized by a 
lack of transparency and accountability, which has weakened 
its credibility and delegitimized it. The dialogue has been rather 
a closed process and Kosovo governments have avoided 
discussions and debates on this topic. Moreover, being 
considered as an “elite pact-making” process, the dialogue has 
lacked credibility and support from the citizens in Kosovo. 
Therefore, most of the agreements that have been reached in 
the Brussels have not been implemented. The lack of 
implementation is also a result of ambiguity, lack of 
transparency and in some cases because the agreements are in 
conflict with the constitutional order. In this context, the April 
agreement, which has been considered as a milestone in the 
Kosovo-Serbia relations, has been rather contradictory. The 
principles highlighted in this agreement and the arrangements 
that derived from the April agreement have threatened 
Kosovo‟s internal organization and constitutional order. The 
agreement on establishing the Association/Community of Serb 
Municipalities has been proved unconstitutional, while the 
agreement on the Judiciary has threatened Kosovo‟s unitary 
legal system. Additionally, the dialogue between Pristina and 
Belgrade is giving Serbia strong formal and informal roles in 
Kosovo, leading to a de facto degree of shared sovereignty in 
parts of Kosovo. 
Meanwhile, the EU role in the process has been rather 
contradictory. While it has been actively engaged in the 
process, by prioritizing stability over rule of law and 
democratization, it has undermined the democratization and 
the rule of law in Kosovo. Furthermore, the lack of a unified 
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policy towards Kosovo (because of the five EU members who 
do not recognize Kosovo), has prevented the EU from 
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